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Abstract—Inverting the hash values by performing brute force
computation is one of the latest security threats on password
based authentication technique. New technologies are being
developed for brute force computation and these increase the
success rate of inversion attack. Honeyword base authentication
protocol can successfully mitigate this threat by making
password cracking detectable. However, the existing schemes
have several limitations like Multiple System Vulnerability,
Weak DoS Resistivity, Storage Overhead, etc. In this paper we
have proposed a new honeyword generation approach, identified
as Paired Distance Protocol (PDP) which overcomes almost all
the drawbacks of previously proposed honeyword generation
approaches. The comprehensive analysis shows that PDP not
only attains a high detection rate of 97.23% but also reduces
the storage cost to a great extent.
Keywords − Authentication; Password; Inversion attack; Hon-
eyword; Paired distance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Password based authentication technique is one of the most
widely used authentication technique as it nicely balances
the security and usability standards. However, like any other
security schemes, password based schemes have also been
challenged by different attack models over times. One such
recently developed attack model is inversion attack and the
model is described next.
A. Inversion attack model
While creating a web-account, user has to register with the
site by submitting the username and password. System stores
the username in plain text whereas the password is converted
into hash (may be with an added salt) using hashing algorithm
H. Thus, the ith user’s login credential − stored by the system,
can be represented by a tuple < ui, H(pi) >. Under inversion
attack model, adversary can successfully invert the hashes
(evaluating pi from H(pi)) from the compromised password
file F. While inverting the hashes, adversary first derives a
password string using some existing techniques [1], [22], [18].
Then adversary matches the password string (appending the
salt, if required) after converting it into hash value using H. If
the obtained hash value gets matched with stored hash value
then adversary becomes successful in inverting the hashes.
Initially, brute force attack was conducted by guessing
many possible combinations to break a password. But time
complexity using this approach used to be very high as attacker
tries for every possible options for cracking a password.
One of the publicly available password cracking algorithm
which significantly reduces the time complexity of inversion
attack − was proposed by John and Ripper in 2008 [1].
In 2009, based on the concept of probabilistic context free
grammar, Weir et.al. were able to crack 28% − 129% more
passwords than Jhon and Ripper password cracking technique.
Recently proposed technique by Ma.et.al [18] − uses Markov
chain model for password cracking and shows significant
improvement over proposed algorithm by Wier et.al.
Evidences : There are some strong evidences of inversion
attack which threats security of some reputed web based
organizations. In recent past, almost 50 millions passwords
of Evernote have been compromised [12] by performing
inversion attack. Giant web-service based organizations like
LinkedIn, Yahoo, RockYou have gone through the same misery
[11]. So there is an urgency for developing an improved
honeyword based framework, robustly handles the inversion
attack.
B. Existing security techniques
Few security techniques have been developed to address
this security issue. There are some tricks using which user’s
password can be transformed into some hash value which
is harder to invert. This type of login set up increases the
login time and does not make successful password cracking
detectable [21]. Another alternative may be − setting up few
fake login accounts by the administrator. An adversary, who
successfully inverts the hash value of any such account, system
detects the security breach. But with some careful analysis,
adversary can distinguish the real usernames from the system
generated usernames [2].
Honeyword based approaches have shown some significant
potential while providing security against inversion attack. Us-
ing this approach system maintains a list of passwords which
contains the real user’s password along with some system
generated passwords, known as honeywords. System generates
these honeywords by using any of the underlying honeyword
generation algorithms such as - take-a-tail [14], modelling-
syntax [5] etc. Once password file F is compromised and
adversary enters any of the honeywords from the password
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list of Wi, system identifies the attack and takes necessary
actions depending upon the security policy.
C. Motivation and Contribution
Among all the honeyword generation techniques proposed
so far − take-a-tail approach (see details in Section II-C) sets
strongest security standard among all [14]. But the technique
threats usability standard to a great extent as user with n
different login accounts, has to remember n different system
generated information as a part of his login credential. More-
over, we have found that all proposed honeyword generation
techniques require to store k-1 (k > 1) honeywords to lure the
attackers. Storing k-1 extra information for each username,
magnifies the storage cost to a great extent.
Thus, from the existing literature surveys, we gist the
motivations behind this work and those are summarized as
below −
• Motivation 1 : All existing honeyword generation
techniques store k-1 decoy passwords to detect the
security breach. Thus, the storage cost is required to be
minimized which increases with the number of users.
• Motivation 2 : Till date, though “take-a-tail" sets highest
security standard but the method threats the usability
standard badly as user requires to remember n different
system generated information for n different accounts.
Like in [10], we also feel that remembering n different
informations for n accounts is infeasible for most of the
users due to limitation of human memory [20]. Thus,
a honeyword based security architecture is needed to be
developed which ensures same security standard as “take-
a-tail" by enhancing the usability standard.
Motivated by the above mentioned facts we have made
following two major contributions in this paper −
• Contribution 1 : We propose a new method termed
as Paired distance protocol (PDP) for generating
honeywords. The method stores only a single information
to generate the honeywords and thus, minimizes the
storage burden significantly.
• Contribution 2 : Using the proposed technique, users
require to remember only a single information (of their
own choice) to maintain n different accounts . Thus,
instead of remembering n system generated different
information for n different accounts (like in “take-a-tail"),
user only remembers a single information and still can
avail the same security standard as “take-a-tail".
Roadmap − In Section II we give an overview and
limitations of existing honeywords generation algorithms. In
Section III we introduce the proposed PDP approach and show
how proposed scheme works to detect the attack? Security
and usability analysis of PDP is illustrated in Section IV
and Section V respectively. In Section VI we show how
PDP minimizes the memory overhead? A detailed comparative
analysis of PDP with existing security techniques is provided
in Section VII. In Section VIII we give a brief outline of
existing work in this direction. Finally we conclude and give
some future directions of our work in Section IX.
II. AN OVERVIEW ON HONEYWORD BASED
AUTHENTICATION TECHNIQUE AND IT’S LIMITATIONS
In this section, first we describe the working principal
of honeyword based authentication scheme. There after we
present limitations of existing schemes, proposed in this di-
rection. But prior to that some of the related notations that we
are going to use, are presented in Table I.
Notations Meaning
ui i
th user in system
pi password of ith user
Wi tuple of passwords stored for ui
k number of elements in Wi
ci index of correct password in Wi
sweetword each element of Wi
TABLE I: Related notations
A. Honeyword based authentication technique
As mentioned in Section I-B, a honeyword generation
scheme maintains a list Wi against each username ui. The
index of correct password is maintained in another file in a
different system (known as “honeychecker"). The basic idea
is − even if Wi is compromised and adversary successfully
inverts each sweetword then also adversary gets confused
about original password of user as user’s complete pass-
word information is distributed over two different systems.
If adversary picks any sweetword from the Ithi index of list
Wi and submits that against user id ui then index of that
sweetword (Ii) is directed to the “honeychecker". If Ii gets
matched with ci, honey-checker directs a positive feedback
to the system administrator otherwise, “honeychecker" directs
a negative feedback. Depending upon the security policy,
system administrator takes necessary actions according to the
received feedback from the “honeychecker". Thus,honeyword
based system provides distributed security which is harder to
compromise as a whole [14].
B. Limitations of honeyword based authentication technique
Though existing honeyword based approaches can provide
security against brute force attack but they have few limita-
tions. The limitations are described below −
(a) Storage overhead − Using honeyword generation
approach, system needs to store k-1 more passwords for each
user account. Thus for a system storing n users accounts,
needs to store n × (k-1) extra information which magnifies
the storage cost to a great extent. This is identified as one
of the major drawback of any honeyword generation approach.
(b) Co-relational hazard − If there exists a relationship
between username and the password (e.g. username as
football and password as maradona) then the original
password of user can easily be identified from the list of Wi.
In such cases honeywords can not mask the original password.
(c) Distinguishable well-known password patterns − If
user uses a password which is related to some well known
object/fact, then attacker can easily identify the original
password. For example, some of the passwords belong to this
category are − bond007, james007, 007bond and 007007 and
were found from the list of 10000 most common passwords
[7].
(d) Issue related to DoS resistivity − If adversary
can guess the honeywords while he knows the original
password of user, then adversary can intentionally submit
honeyword to generate a false negetive feedback signal by
the “honeychecker" (while F is not compromised). Adversary
can submit honeywords from many user accounts (either by
creating them or, by knowing original password of users by
shoulder surfing attack [17]) so that system understands the
password file F has been compromised when it is actually
not. If system senses submission of honeywords from too
many accounts then system may block the whole web server.
This is known as Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack [4]. Thus,
original password of user must not give any idea about system
generated honeywords to avoid DoS attack. Some of the
honeyword generation techniques like − chaffing-by-tweaking
digits [14] provide weak security against such kind of attack
while some others like − modelling-syntax-approach [5]
provide strong security against DoS.
(e) Issue related to Multiple System Vulnerability −
If a user uses same password in two (or more) different
systems (where systems are using same honeyword generation
algorithm) and an adversary gets access to both the systems,
then Multiple System Vulnerability may occur. In this case,
adversary may obtain obtains two lists of Wi for user ui. Let
W
Sj
i denotes list of sweetwords for user ui in the system
Sj . Now if generated honeywords belong to W
Sp
i and W
Sq
i
(where p 6= q) are different (probability of which is close
to 1) then by performing intersection operation WSpi ∩WSqi
adversary obtains the original password. This is identified as
Multiple System Vulnerability (MSV) of honeyword based
authentication technique.
(f) Issue regarding Typo safety − A honeyword generation
technique is called typo safe if typing mistake of users during
entering of the password does not get match with any of
the honeywords. “Chaffing-by-tweaking" [14] methods are not
much typo safe as a legitimate user may accidentally submit
a honeyword. Consider the following example where user
chooses his password as road8. Now “chaffing-by-tweaking-
digits" may produce following list of sweetwords for k = 6
road9 road2 road5 road8 road4 road6
From the above list of sweetwords it can be seen that,
honeywords are created from user password road8 by replacing
the single digit. So the probability that user typing mistake will
Enter Username : Alice
Enter Password Choice : ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗
Append 613 to complete your password
Enter Revised Password : ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Fig. 1: Registration interface of take-a-tail
match with a honeyword for k = 6 is 5/9 (if user mistakenly
enters a wrong digit while prefix of the password (here road)
remains same).
“Take-a-tail" method proposed by Juels and Rivest, suc-
cessfully addresses all the above mentioned drawbacks except
storage overhead. A brief overview and limitation of “take-a-
tail" is presented next before we go into details of the proposed
PDP protocol.
C. Take-a-tail : An overview and limitation
Using “take-a-tail" user first provides the username and his
password choice during the course of registration to a system.
System then generates a random string of length `(> 0)
consisting of alphabets and (or) digits, identified as tail in [14].
While login to the system, user requires to submit username
and password along with the system generated tail. Thus, the
user registration interface can be described as shown in Fig.
1.
The example in Fig.1 shows that system generates 613 as
a tail. During each login session, user requires to submit the
password along with the appended tail. System generates the
sweetwords by the “chaffing-by-tweaking" tail. Thus, for the
password street613 (613 is tail here) the following probable
list of sweetwords for k = 5 is −
street124 street498 street668 street613 street153
Thus, even if there exist a co-relational hazard, adversary can
hardly distinguish the user’s original password from the list
of sweetwords. As tails differ for each login account of a
user thus, MSV is also avoidable even if user chooses the
same password. Knowing the original password (along with
tail) also makes it difficult for the adversary to guess the
honeywords and as a result provides a standard security against
DoS attack. Thus, with some careful observation it is easily
understandable that “take-a-tail" overcomes all the drawbacks
mentioned in Section II-B, except the storage overhead.
As discussed earlier, the limitation of this approach remains
in remembering n different system generated tails for n
different login accounts and this reduces the usability factor
to a great extent. Other than this, “take-a-tail" imposes same
storage overhead as other honeyword generation approaches.
Next we introduce the proposed PDP − a storage optimized
honeyword generation approach with enhanced usability factor.
III. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
Our proposed approach is identified as Paired Distance
Protocol or PDP. Using the proposed approach user needs to
provide three information − (a) Username (b) Password and
(c) a Random String RS of length ` − containing alphabet
and numbers of user’s own choice. The default length of RS
is set as 3. Thus, along with password, user has to remember
another secret information as RS. Initially, it may appear to
be an overhead but RS provides several advantages which we
have discussed elaborately in the subsequent sections. Few
important characteristics of RS are discussed next.
Using PDP user can use the same RS for different systems.
However, users are strongly advised to choose a random
RS (e.g. not a dictionary word). If chosen RS by user is
hard to guess and doesn’t follow either a specific pattern
(e.g. sequential keystroke) or, dictionary word (e.g. fox) and
there is no correlation with either username or password (e.g.
username − jerry, password − face and RS − eye) − then
randomness of RS is considered as high. No element in RS
should get repeated to avoid DoS attack (see detail in Section
IV-B).
Our assumption behind setting up high randomness of string
RS by user is valid because remembering RS doesn’t impose
much overhead on users as −
• The string length of RS is less (considered as 3 to avoid
specific pattern like date of birth).
• User may use same RS for different login accounts.
The registration interface using PDP can be described by
the Fig. 2
Enter Username : Alice
Enter Password Choice : ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗
Choose a random string
to complete your password
Enter Revised Password : ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Fig. 2: Registration interface of PDP
The fundamental differences between “take-a-tail" and pro-
posed approach − from usability perspective, is presented in
Table II.
Take-a-tail PDP
User remembers User remembers
the extra information the extra information of
generated by system his own choice
For n different For n different
accounts, user must accounts, user may
remember n information remember single information
TABLE II: Differences between “take-a-tail" and PDP from
usability perspective
Next we elaborate on how honeyword can be generated by
using our proposed approach?
A. Setting up the honey circular list
Recently proposed Sauth approach [16] shows how different
web-servers can collaborate to achieve a high security stan-
dard. We also follow the same principle to get rid of MSV
issue of honeyword based authentication scheme. First of all a
circular list − identified as honey circular list or hcl of length
|hcl| is created which holds the alphabet and digits in random
Fig. 3: Honey Circular List : Contains alphabets and digits in
random order
order. The default value of |hcl| is considered as 36 here. For
default value of |hcl| we show one instance of hcl in Fig. 3.
This hcl is then securely distributed to m different sys-
tems (may be facebook, google etc.), participating in creating
honeywords using PDP protocol. The hcl is maintained in
the password file F. The utility of hcl for avoiding DoS is
elaborated in Section IV-B.
B. Maintaining the user database
While maintaining the user’s login information in the
database, system does the following tricks. System first stores
username along with the password (may be in the hash
format) of user. System then measures the distance between
the consecutive elements of RS with respect to the elements
stored in hcl. The distance between any two elements of the
hcl is known as paired distance and is defined as follows −
Definition 1: Paired distance: Paired distance between two
elements e1 and e2, denoted as Pr(e1, e2) − is the number of
cells that has to be traversed in clock wise direction in the
honey circular list to reach from element e1 to element e2.
Suppose user chooses RS as “tp7" then paired distance can
be calculated as Pr(t,p) = 35 and Pr(p,7) = 6. Along with
username and password, system stores this paired distances
between two consecutive elements of RS separated by “−"
(e.g. 35− 6).
Definition 2: Distance chain : Distance chain is the set of
n-1 paired distances (separated by “ − ”) between every two
consecutive elements of RS, having length n.
Along with username and password, (instead of storing k-
1 honeywords) system maintains the distance chain derived
from RS in password file F. While analysing, we have found
a special property of distance chain and we identified it as
uniqueness property which is defined next.
Uniqueness property of distance chain : Given a hcl and
a particular distance chain − RS can be uniquely derived if
first element of RS is known.
Let’s describe this with the previous example. Suppose
distance chain 35−6 is known along with the first element of
RS which is “t". Now with respect to the hcl shown in Fig. 3,
string “tp7" can be derived by performing reverse calculation
which is unique. Now if first element of RS is unknown then
starting with each element of hcl a given distance chain can
be derived. For example, if distance chain is 35 − 6 then by
reverse calculation, string “k8b", “ekx" etc can be derived
using the hcl shown in Fig. 3. Thus for a given distance chain
total number of possible RS is |hcl|.
Necessity of choosing RS : The strength of PDP depends on
randomness of string RS. The honeywords are generated using
the string RS and hcl. While analysing, we found that normal
tendency of users is to use meaningful phrase in their password
[7] (e.g. secret123, where secret is meaningful). From the
distance chain stored by the system, adversary becomes able
to derive different possible strings, which also contain the
chosen RS by user. If user password is used in place of RS
for generating the distance chain then adversary may able to
distinguish user’s original password. The reason behind this
is − due to random organization of characters in hcl, the
probability of deriving a string − containing a meaningful
phrase (except the original password of user), is very less.
Now as meaningful phrase is used in most of the passwords,
created by user thus, from the derived strings from the hcl
and the distance chain, adversary can easily distinguish user’s
original password from the non-meaningful derived strings.
Hence there is a necessity of choosing RS which is random
enough and can’t be easily guessed by the adversary.
C. Maintaining the honeychecker
In existing approaches, generally honey-checker maintains
the index of original password of the user along with user-
name. In the proposed approach, along with username, “hon-
eychecker" maintains first character of the RS, chosen by the
user.
D. Working principal of the proposed scheme
During login, when user submits the login credentials,
system first checks the correctness of the password entered
by the user. If the password entered by the user is incorrect
then system straightaway denies the user login.
If password entered by the user is correct then system
derives the distance chain from the submitted RS. If derived
distance chain doesn’t get matched with the stored distance
chain in the password file F then system denies the user.
If derived distance chain gets matched with stored one,
system then communicates the first element of RS (submitted
by the user) to the “honeychecker". If first element of RS
submitted by the user gets matched with the element stored
in “honeychecker" then “honeychecker" directs positive feed-
back to the administrator otherwise “honeychecker" directs a
negative feedback by detecting the attack.
E. Evaluating the probability of detecting the attack
Instead of storing k-1 extra information PDP is just storing
one extra information as distance chain. Now there can be |hcl|
number of probable RS corresponding to a distance chain.
Thus, by storing a single information, systen confuses the
attacker among |hcl| different possibilities. For default value
of |hcl| = 36, the attack can be detected with the probability
of 35/36 (or, 97.23% chances).
F. Password meter
Password meter shows how random RS is? If randomness
of the RS is high then password meter shows strong signal
otherwise, it shows weak signal. Below we show some of the
instances of choice of RS for which randomness is low −
• RS is concatenated with user password and if it makes
some dictionary word (e.g. password − rab, RS − bit).
• If RS itself is a dictionary word (e.g. fox).
• RS follows a specific pattern (like, sequential keystroke),
distinguishable by attacker.
Users are recommended to change their RS if password meter
shows low randomness. If there exist a co-relation among
username, password and RS then also randomness of RS
becomes low, though password meter is not able to address
that.
IV. SECURITY STANDARDS
There are three well defined security parameters for evaluat-
ing the robustness of any honeyword generation algorithms −
(a) Flatness (b) DoS resiliency and (c) Security against MSV.
Next we will evaluate the strength of PDP by considering
these three security standards along with a new security factor
termed as collaborative security.
A. Flatness
If system maintains k sweetwords against a user ui then
attacker may get confused among k possible options once
Wi is compromised. Now sometimes it may happen that,
adversary can easily identify the password chosen by the user
from the list Wi (e.g. if there exists a correlation between
username and password). A honeyword generation algorithm
is said to be perfectly-flat if adversary has no advantage
while identifying the user’s original password from the list
of Wi. If the honeyword generation algorithm is perfectly-
flat then probability of selecting the original password of
user from list Wi is 1/k. If the probability of selecting user
password from the list Wi is slightly greater than 1/k, then
the honeyword generation algorithm is called approximately-
flat. A good honeyword generation algorithm is required to be
perfectly-flat.
PDP becomes a perfectly-flat technique if the randomness
of chosen RS is high.
B. DoS resiliency
Performing DoS attack (discussed in Section II-B) is highly
impossible on a PDP secure system. DoS attack is only
possible if adversary can generate a distance chain that is
maintained by the system for any different RS not chosen by
user. As RS not allows repetition of characters thus, adversary
requires the knowledge of orientation of characters in the hcl
to perform the attack. For example, if RS allows repetition of
characters then adversary may create a distance chain made
from characters RRR and while login, adversary may submit
RS as SSS to perform DoS attack. This is because both the RS
derive same distance chain as 0− 0 but first character stored
in “honeychecker" (here R) mismatches with first character of
submitted RS (here S). Hence adversary becomes successful
to accomplish the DoS attack.
As all the elements in RS get differ from each other thus,
without knowing the orientation of characters in the hcl, the
probability of generating a given distance chain by submitting
a RS (which is not chosen by user) can be calculated by
Equation 1.
|hcl| − 1×
`−1∑
i=0
1
|hcl| − i (1)
For the default values of parameters (` = 3 and |hcl| = 36)
the probability of successful DoS attack becomes 0.81×10−3,
which is very less.
C. Security against MSV
A user may use same password in Z (> 1) different
systems which use the same honeyword generation algorithm.
Now if two such different systems are compromised then
adversary can get the original password of user by performing
an intersection operation. This is because, for a given pass-
word, a honeyword generation algorithm produces different
honeywords at each run with very high probability (close to 1)
[14] [5]. Thus, for a given password, a honeyword generation
algorithm produces different honeywords for each system.
Now if PDP is adopted by Z different systems which secretly
share a hcl, then for a given RS all the system generated
distance chains will be same. Thus, even if two different
accounts of a user (using the same password) are compromised
− then also MSV will not occur.
Another important observation is that, by identifying user
ui’s login credentials in a system, adversary would not be
able to guess the password or RS used by ui in other accounts
unless both password and RS are same.
D. Collaborative security
In PDP approach, if a system senses that the hcl has
been compromised (after “honeychecker" generates negative
feedback for E(> 1) users accounts) then it will broadcast a
security message (sm) to all other systems − generating hon-
eywords, by using the same hcl. Once such sm is received by
all the systems, a new hcl is being generated (with a different
orientation of same set of characters) by the compromised
system and is received by all the systems under this PDP
approach. In Fig. 4 we give a pictorial overview on how hcl
is being shared among different systems?
After receiving the new hcl, each system does the following
things −
• From the first character of RS stored in the “honey-
checker" and with the reference of distance chain and
previous hcl, system generates (and temporary stores) RS
for each user. For example, after receiving t as the first
character of RS from “honeychecker" system can derive
Fig. 4: Above figure shows PDP protocol is used by n different
systems by using same hcl. Vertical dotted line indicates the
compromised system. sm.i indicates security message from
ith system. ack.i denotes the acknowledgement generated by
ith system. u-hcl.i indicates the updated hcl generated by ith
system. The compromised system generates updated hcl after
it receives acknowledgement from all other n-1 systems.
the complete RS as tp7 with the help of distance chain
35− 6 and with the hcl shown in Fig. 3.
• After deriving the string RS for each user, the previous
hcl is replaced by new hcl with the different orientation
of characters.
• By calculating the paired distance between the consecu-
tive characters of RS from the new hcl, system derives
the new distance chain for each user and communicates
the first character of RS to “honeychecker".
• After setting the complete password information, system
then removes the stored RS for each user.
Thus, by setting the high randomness of string RS, user may
set a high security standard in terms of flatness, DoS resistivity
and security against MSV.
V. USABILITY STANDARDS
The usability standard, set by a honeyword generation
approach can be measured in terms of three parameters −
(a) Typo safety (b) System interference and (c) Stress on
memorability. Each of these are discussed next.
A. Typo safety
A honeyword generation algorithm is called typo safe if
typing mistake of users doesn’t lead to generate a negative
feedback signal by honey-checker. Using PDP, honey-checker
generates a negative feedback signal only if the string other
than RS derives a distance chain that gets matched with the
stored distance chain. While typing the RS, user can enter
either (a) sub part of RS as wrong or, (b) all the elements
of RS as wrong. If user enters sub part of RS as wrong (e.g.
instead of tp7, if he enters tp8) then it will never evaluate
a distance chain which gets matched with the stored one. If
user enters all the elements of RS wrong (which may rarely
happen) by typing mistake, the probability that a same distance
Honeyword Flatness DoS Security System Typo Stress on Storage
method Resiliency against MSV interference safety memorability overhead
CTD 1/k if U ≈ G low low no low low k-1
modelling -syntax 1/k if U ≈ G high low no high low k-1
take-a- tail 1/k (unconditionally) low high high high high k-1
PDP 1/k ~ high high low high low 1
TABLE III: Comparative usability analysis of honeyword generation methods. U ≈ G indicates, if honeywords are distributed
like user chosen password from the adversary point of view. ~ indicates if randomness of RS is high. Storage overhead shows
the extra information system has to store in password file F.
chain (liked stored one) will be generated, can be derived by
Equation 2, same as Equation 1.
Prob = |hcl| − 1×
`−1∑
i=0
1
|hcl − i| (2)
For the default values of parameters Equation 2 can be
evaluated as 0.81 × 10−3 which is significantly less. Thus,
PDP is highly typo safe.
B. System interference
System interference of a honeyword system reflects −
how much a honeyword generation algorithm influences the
password choice of the user? If user needs to adjust his
password according to the honeyword generation policy of the
system then there exists system interference. Here we define
three level system interference − a) High system interference
− where user needs to adjust/manipulate his password choice
based on the parameter value provided by system. Like in
“take-a-tail" [14], choosing a three digit tail may be considered
as a parameter whereas “635" may be considered a valid
parameter value set by the system. This value is needed to be
remembered by the user. b) Low system interference − where
user sets the value of the parameter to manipulate his password
choice. The proposed method PDP, requires to set the RS
(considered as a parameter) where the parameter value (i.e.
elements of RS) is chosen by the user. We consider this as low
system interference as system gives the opportunity to user to
choose the value of his own choice. c) No system interference
− where user needs not to manipulate his password choice.
C. Stress on memorability
There exists a relation between system interference and
stress on memorability. If system interference of a honeyword
scheme is high, then user has to remember different system
generated information for different login accounts. These
increase the stress on memorability. On the other hand, using
a honeyword generation scheme having low/no system inter-
ference, user may use the same login credential for different
login accounts. Thus, stress on memorability becomes low
in this case. Proposed PDP approach imposes low stress on
memorability because of it’s low system interference.
VI. STORAGE COST
Using the previously proposed honeyword generation algo-
rithms system maintains k-1 extra passwords along with the
original password of user, in the password file F. On the other
hand index of the original password of the user is maintained
in “honeychecker" server. If we assume that for storing a single
password, system requires θ memory space then for storing
password information of n users, would require nθk space.
Whereas the required space in “honeychecker" is nθ. Using
PDP, for each user, system stores two information (password
and distance chain). Thus, the password storing cost for n
users in password file F becomes 2nθ. Though, PDP maintains
a hcl of size |hcl|θ − but the storage cost does not depend
on number of users. So storage cost of hcl is negligible. As
memory cost of storing an index value in the “honeychecker"
is very similar with storing a digit/alphabet so, required space
in “honeychecker" is same as nθ. Thus, PDP saves a memory
overhead nθ(k-2) .
As any standard honeyword system maintains the value of
k as 20 for moderate detection rate [14] thus PDP saves a
memory overhead 18nθ which is a huge benefit.
VII. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
In the scope of this section, we compare PDP with some of
the recently proposed honeyword generation approaches (a)
Chaffing-by-tweaking-digits (CTD) [14], (b) Take-a-tail [14]
and (c) Modelling-syntax-approach [5], in terms of security
and usability standards (shown in Table III).
Above table shows that by choosing a high random RS,
user can avail the same security standard as “take-a-tail" in
terms of providing security with respect to Flatness and MSV.
The limited strength of “take-a-tail" in term of providing
security against DoS attack [14] has also been overcome
by PDP approach. Thus, depending upon the randomness
of RS, PDP ensures the highest level of security standard.
From the usability perspective, PDP significantly raises the
bar compared to “take-a-tail" in terms of system interference
and stress on memorability and makes PDP highly practical
approach to be used by common users. Most importantly, PDP
reduces the storage overhead compared to all existing security
approaches − by storing a single information which is a huge
benefit.
VIII. RELATED WORK
The modern password cracking algorithm uses the concept
of probabilistic context free grammars [22]. In [15], Kelley
et al. characterizes the vulnerability of the passwords under
the same threat model [22] by considering different password-
compositions policies. One of such weak password composi-
tion policy is “basic8" in which users are instructed “Password
must have atleast 8 characters". One billion guess is sufficient
to guess 40.3% of such passwords. In [3], authors show that by
using a single graphical processing unit, three billion guesses
per second can be achievable to crack the hash functions like -
MD5. Among the 70 million yahoo users it has been observed
that majority of the passwords are having little more than 20
bits of effective entropy [19] against an optimal attacker [6].
The honeyword scheme gives tremendous support to the con-
ventional password scheme in terms of providing security and
can be incorporated with the conventional password system.
To the best of our knowledge, in 2006 Fred Cohen has made
the first contribution in this domain [9]. There after many
methodologies have been proposed in this direction. The idea
has been deployed to many password related domains. Herley
and Florencio [13] use this concept to protect online banking
accounts from brute-force attack. Bojinov et al. propose the
concept of “Kamouflage" where real password of the user is
stored along with the fake passwords but this does not include
the concept of “honeychecker" server [5]. Later in [14], au-
thors introduce the concept of “honeychecker" server to detect
the password cracking mechanism. Recently Chakraborty and
Mondal show how honeywords can be used to detect shoulder
surfing attack [8].
IX. CONCLUSION
Honeyword based techniques are getting popular as it
provides several advantages over traditional password based
schemes. However, the storage cost is one of the major
overhead of honeyword based schemes. In this paper we
have proposed a novel honeyword generation approach which
reduces the storage overhead and also it addresses majority of
the drawbacks of existing honeyword generation techniques.
The only shortfall of PDP is, user has to remember an extra
information in terms of RS. In future we would like to analyse
the possibility of developing a honeyword generation technique
without remembering any extra information by the users.
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